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  archives: Vol. 1, Issue 1 - March 2002


Bill and Keep as the Efficient Interconnection Regime?

The Review of Network Economics

Volume 1, Issue 1 - March 2002,  pp 54-60

  Julian Wright
Department of Economics, University of Auckland
E-mail:[email protected]

  In this paper I review the recent paper by DeGraba (2000) that proposes a version of Bill and Keep (called COBAK) as the efficient interconnection regime. I argue while the proposed interconnection regime is suitable for some types of interconnection it would be quite undesirable for others. I show that whether the COBAK approach is suitable for a particular type of interconnection depends on, among other things, the importance of network externalities and on the willingness of called parties versus calling parties to pay for calls.

Keywords: Interconnection, bill and keep, telecommunications.

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