||archives: Vol. 1, Issue 2 - September 2002
Did The High Court Reach An Economic Low In
Verizon v. FCC?
The Review of Network Economics
Volume 1, Issue 2 - September 2002, pp 90-105
||The Supreme Court's decision in Verizon v. FCC rests on two errant interpretations of the 1996 Telecommunications Act: First, the Act represents a new form of regulation rather than a deregulatory statute; Second, Congress intended that the playing field be tilted in favor of new entrants. Under the Chevron Doctrine, deference is given to the controlling federal agency if there is a "rational connection" between the regulations and statutory intent. The Court ruled that the FCC's implementation of the Act survives that scrutiny. This discussion contests that finding and argues that the FCC's regulations undermine the goals of the Act.
Keywords: Telecommunications, TELRIC, pricing, Verizon v FCC.
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