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Abstract

Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators

The Review of Network Economics

Vol. 6, Issue 3 - September 2007, pp 372 - 396



Author
  Hal J. Singer
Criterion Economics, L.L.C.
E-mail: [email protected]

J. Gregory Sidak
Georgetown University Law Center

Abstract
  This paper argues that a cable operator with sufficient market power in the downstream multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) market can deny access to unaffiliated programmers, resulting in an upstream programming rival's exit or impaired dynamic efficiency. Further, market dominance by cable operators may harm consumers of video programming through higher prices and less choice in the downstream MVPD market. The reason is that as unaffiliated video programming becomes affiliated programming, the latter is then withheld from rival MVPDs. This analysis is then applied to the recent acquisition of Adelphia by Comcast and Time Warner.

Keywords: Vertical foreclosure, video programming markets, cable operators, Adelphia, Comcast, TimeWarner
JEL Codes: K21, L42, L51, L96, L82.

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