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  archives: Vol. 1, Issue 1 - March 2002


Bill and Keep as the Efficient Interconnection Regime?: A Reply

The Review of Network Economics

Volume 1, Issue 1 - March 2002,  pp 61-65

  Patrick DeGraba
Charles River Associates
1201 F St NW, Suite 700 Washington DC 20004
E-mail: [email protected]

  In a critique of my paper outlining the Central Office Bill and Keep (COBAK) proposal, Wright (2001) offers two sets of conditions under which a COBAK interconnection regime would not lead to efficient utilization. There could be conditions under which some interconnection regime other than COBAK would lead to higher social surplus measures in very simple models of telecommunications. However, the critique provides no evidence that these conditions would be empirically verified. This, along with the other considerations explained in the proposal and not considered in the analysis, continue to suggest that COBAK is an appropriate policy recommendation.

Keywords: Interconnection, bill and keep, telecommunications.

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